(A) game-theoretic study on user data collection strategies in secret browsing mode

Abstract

This paper studies the user's expectation of the private browsing mode (the secret mode) and the browser's strategies. Users expect that the secret mode browser will not track or share personal information on the Internet. However, in reality, some browsers voluntarily track user data in the secret mode because of revenue. Tracking more users allows for targeted advertising on the browser and thus increases advertising revenue, which is one of the main sources of revenue for browsers. However, tracking privacy-sensitive users can backfire because they may find out about being tracked by the browsers and churn. This can lead to a browser’s lower market share, which would hurt the browser’s advertising revenue and revenue from other added values. This paper analyzes these tradeoffs that a browser faces in tracking vs. not tracking users in secret mode using a model of reputation and identifies the browser’s equilibrium tracking strategy.