Price of anarchy in transportation networks: Efficiency and optimality control

Uncoordinated individuals in human society pursuing their personally optimal strategies do not always achieve the social optimum, the most beneficial state to the society as a whole. Instead, strategies form Nash equilibria which are often socially suboptimal. Society, therefore, has to pay a price of anarchy for the lack of coordination among its members. Here we assess this price of anarchy by analyzing the travel times in road networks of several major cities. Our simulation shows that uncoordinated drivers possibly waste a considerable amount of their travel time. Counterintuitively, simply blocking certain streets can partially improve the traffic conditions. We analyze various complex networks and discuss the possibility of similar paradoxes in physics.
Publisher
AMER PHYSICAL SOC
Issue Date
2008-09
Language
ENG
Keywords

BRAESS PARADOX; BEHAVIOR

Citation

PHYSICAL REVIEW LETTERS, v.101, no.12, pp.128701 -

ISSN
0031-9007
DOI
10.1103/PhysRevLett.101.128701
URI
http://hdl.handle.net/10203/87431
Appears in Collection
PH-Journal Papers(저널논문)
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