Buyers alliances for bargaining power

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We provide a novel explanation as to why forming an alliance of buyers (or sellers) across separate markets can be advantageous when input prices are determined by bargaining. Our explanation helps to understand the prevalence of buyer cooperatives among small and medium-sized firms.
Publisher
M I T PRESS
Issue Date
2004
Language
English
Article Type
Article
Keywords

COUNTERVAILING-POWER; EARNINGS MANAGEMENT; VERTICAL MERGERS; EQUILIBRIUM; HYPOTHESIS; INDUSTRY; FIRM

Citation

JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS MANAGEMENT STRATEGY, v.13, no.4, pp.731 - 754

ISSN
1058-6407
DOI
10.1111/j.1430-9134.2004.00030.x
URI
http://hdl.handle.net/10203/82956
Appears in Collection
MG-Journal Papers(저널논문)
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