DC Field | Value | Language |
---|---|---|
dc.contributor.author | Chae, Suchan | ko |
dc.contributor.author | Heidhues, P | ko |
dc.date.accessioned | 2013-03-04T14:31:47Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2013-03-04T14:31:47Z | - |
dc.date.created | 2012-02-06 | - |
dc.date.created | 2012-02-06 | - |
dc.date.issued | 2004 | - |
dc.identifier.citation | JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS MANAGEMENT STRATEGY, v.13, no.4, pp.731 - 754 | - |
dc.identifier.issn | 1058-6407 | - |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/10203/82956 | - |
dc.description.abstract | We provide a novel explanation as to why forming an alliance of buyers (or sellers) across separate markets can be advantageous when input prices are determined by bargaining. Our explanation helps to understand the prevalence of buyer cooperatives among small and medium-sized firms. | - |
dc.language | English | - |
dc.publisher | M I T PRESS | - |
dc.subject | COUNTERVAILING-POWER | - |
dc.subject | EARNINGS MANAGEMENT | - |
dc.subject | VERTICAL MERGERS | - |
dc.subject | EQUILIBRIUM | - |
dc.subject | HYPOTHESIS | - |
dc.subject | INDUSTRY | - |
dc.subject | FIRM | - |
dc.title | Buyers alliances for bargaining power | - |
dc.type | Article | - |
dc.identifier.wosid | 000224433900008 | - |
dc.identifier.scopusid | 2-s2.0-9444294968 | - |
dc.type.rims | ART | - |
dc.citation.volume | 13 | - |
dc.citation.issue | 4 | - |
dc.citation.beginningpage | 731 | - |
dc.citation.endingpage | 754 | - |
dc.citation.publicationname | JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS MANAGEMENT STRATEGY | - |
dc.identifier.doi | 10.1111/j.1430-9134.2004.00030.x | - |
dc.contributor.localauthor | Chae, Suchan | - |
dc.contributor.nonIdAuthor | Heidhues, P | - |
dc.type.journalArticle | Article | - |
dc.subject.keywordPlus | COUNTERVAILING-POWER | - |
dc.subject.keywordPlus | EARNINGS MANAGEMENT | - |
dc.subject.keywordPlus | VERTICAL MERGERS | - |
dc.subject.keywordPlus | EQUILIBRIUM | - |
dc.subject.keywordPlus | HYPOTHESIS | - |
dc.subject.keywordPlus | INDUSTRY | - |
dc.subject.keywordPlus | FIRM | - |
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