DC Field | Value | Language |
---|---|---|
dc.contributor.author | Seog, S. Hun | ko |
dc.date.accessioned | 2013-03-09T00:40:05Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2013-03-09T00:40:05Z | - |
dc.date.created | 2012-02-06 | - |
dc.date.created | 2012-02-06 | - |
dc.date.issued | 2010-02 | - |
dc.identifier.citation | INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC REVIEW, v.51, no.1, pp.125 - 142 | - |
dc.identifier.issn | 0020-6598 | - |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/10203/94840 | - |
dc.description.abstract | I investigate the interrelation between a product market and an insurance market when adverse-selection problems exist both in consumers and in firms. Firms offer warranties for product failures. Consumers may further purchase first-party insurance for the residual risks of product failures. Given that the insurance market exists, two types of equilibria are possible: (a) Different firm types offer different pooling warranties attracting both good and bad consumer types or (b) good firms attract only bad consumers and bad firms attract both types of consumers. I discuss the existence and the efficiency implication of the insurance market. | - |
dc.language | English | - |
dc.publisher | BLACKWELL PUBLISHING | - |
dc.subject | IMPERFECT INFORMATION | - |
dc.subject | MORAL HAZARD | - |
dc.subject | WARRANTIES | - |
dc.subject | CONTRACTS | - |
dc.subject | DISCRIMINATION | - |
dc.subject | COMMITMENT | - |
dc.subject | INDUSTRY | - |
dc.subject | QUALITY | - |
dc.subject | MODEL | - |
dc.title | DOUBLE-SIDED ADVERSE SELECTION IN THE PRODUCT MARKET AND THE ROLE OF THE INSURANCE MARKET | - |
dc.type | Article | - |
dc.identifier.wosid | 000274922900005 | - |
dc.type.rims | ART | - |
dc.citation.volume | 51 | - |
dc.citation.issue | 1 | - |
dc.citation.beginningpage | 125 | - |
dc.citation.endingpage | 142 | - |
dc.citation.publicationname | INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC REVIEW | - |
dc.contributor.localauthor | Seog, S. Hun | - |
dc.type.journalArticle | Article | - |
dc.subject.keywordPlus | IMPERFECT INFORMATION | - |
dc.subject.keywordPlus | MORAL HAZARD | - |
dc.subject.keywordPlus | WARRANTIES | - |
dc.subject.keywordPlus | CONTRACTS | - |
dc.subject.keywordPlus | DISCRIMINATION | - |
dc.subject.keywordPlus | COMMITMENT | - |
dc.subject.keywordPlus | INDUSTRY | - |
dc.subject.keywordPlus | QUALITY | - |
dc.subject.keywordPlus | MODEL | - |
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