Fault tree construction of hybrid system requirements using qualitative formal method

Abstract

When specifying requirements for software controlling hybrid systems and conducting safety analysis, engineers experience that requirements are often known only in qualitative terms and that existing fault tree analysis techniques provide little guidance on formulating and evaluating potential failure modes. In this paper, we propose Causal Requirements Safety Analysis (CRSA) as a technique to qualitatively evaluate causal relationship between software faults and physical hazards. This technique, extending qualitative formal method process and utilizing information captured in the state trajectory, provides specific guidelines on how to identify failure modes and relationship among them. Using a simplified electrical power system as an example, we describe step-by-step procedures of conducting CRSA. Our experience of applying CRSA to per-form fault tree analysis on requirements for the Wolsong nuclear power plant shutdown system indicates that CRSA is an effective technique in assisting safety engineers. (C) 2004 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.