On the relevance of alternatives in bargaining: generalized average pay-off solutions

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dc.contributor.authorIn, Younghwanko
dc.date.accessioned2013-03-06T09:10:30Z-
dc.date.available2013-03-06T09:10:30Z-
dc.date.created2012-02-06-
dc.date.created2012-02-06-
dc.date.issued2008-06-
dc.identifier.citationINTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF GAME THEORY, v.37, no.2, pp.251 - 264-
dc.identifier.issn0020-7276-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10203/86512-
dc.description.abstractWe generalize the average pay-off solution proposed by Anbarci (Can J Econ 28:675-682, 1995), which depends on all the alternatives, and show that the Nash and Kalai-Smorodinsky solutions are limits of generalized average pay-off solutions. We formalize the notion of relevant alternatives and compare solutions in terms of the relevance of alternatives.-
dc.languageEnglish-
dc.publisherSPRINGER HEIDELBERG-
dc.subjectAREA MONOTONIC SOLUTION-
dc.titleOn the relevance of alternatives in bargaining: generalized average pay-off solutions-
dc.typeArticle-
dc.identifier.wosid000256932100007-
dc.identifier.scopusid2-s2.0-45749092143-
dc.type.rimsART-
dc.citation.volume37-
dc.citation.issue2-
dc.citation.beginningpage251-
dc.citation.endingpage264-
dc.citation.publicationnameINTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF GAME THEORY-
dc.identifier.doi10.1007/s00182-007-0112-3-
dc.embargo.liftdate9999-12-31-
dc.embargo.terms9999-12-31-
dc.contributor.localauthorIn, Younghwan-
dc.type.journalArticleArticle-
dc.subject.keywordAuthorbargaining-
dc.subject.keywordAuthoraxioms-
dc.subject.keywordAuthorgeneralized average pay-off solutions-
dc.subject.keywordAuthorrelevance of alternatives-
dc.subject.keywordPlusAREA MONOTONIC SOLUTION-
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