DC Field | Value | Language |
---|---|---|
dc.contributor.author | Kim, Jae-Cheol | ko |
dc.contributor.author | Jung, Choong-Young | ko |
dc.date.accessioned | 2013-03-02T16:56:45Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2013-03-02T16:56:45Z | - |
dc.date.created | 2012-02-06 | - |
dc.date.created | 2012-02-06 | - |
dc.date.issued | 1995-11 | - |
dc.identifier.citation | JOURNAL OF REGULATORY ECONOMICS, v.8, no.3, pp.299 - 307 | - |
dc.identifier.issn | 0922-680X | - |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/10203/74565 | - |
dc.description.abstract | The purpose of the present paper is to construct a regulatory scheme that serves to correct suboptimal behavior of a multi-product monopolist in a situation of doubly asymmetric information, where the regulator cannot observe the monopolist's cost structure and consumers' preference while the monopolist cannot identify consumer types. We construct a tax scheme that induces the monopolist to offer socially optimal qualities to all types of consumers and discuss some interesting features of the scheme. | - |
dc.language | English | - |
dc.publisher | SPRINGER | - |
dc.subject | SELF-SELECTION PROBLEMS | - |
dc.subject | QUALITY DISTORTION | - |
dc.subject | INFORMATION | - |
dc.subject | CHOICE | - |
dc.title | Regulating a multi-product monopolist | - |
dc.type | Article | - |
dc.identifier.wosid | A1995TG70100005 | - |
dc.identifier.scopusid | 2-s2.0-21844489452 | - |
dc.type.rims | ART | - |
dc.citation.volume | 8 | - |
dc.citation.issue | 3 | - |
dc.citation.beginningpage | 299 | - |
dc.citation.endingpage | 307 | - |
dc.citation.publicationname | JOURNAL OF REGULATORY ECONOMICS | - |
dc.contributor.localauthor | Kim, Jae-Cheol | - |
dc.contributor.nonIdAuthor | Jung, Choong-Young | - |
dc.type.journalArticle | Article | - |
dc.subject.keywordPlus | SELF-SELECTION PROBLEMS | - |
dc.subject.keywordPlus | QUALITY DISTORTION | - |
dc.subject.keywordPlus | INFORMATION | - |
dc.subject.keywordPlus | CHOICE | - |
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