An optimal tax/subsidy for output and pollution control under asymmetric information in oligopoly markets
| DC Field | Value | Language |
|---|---|---|
| dc.contributor.author | Kim, Jae-Cheol | ko |
| dc.contributor.author | Kim, Jae-Cheol | ko |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2013-02-25T16:55:22Z | - |
| dc.date.available | 2013-02-25T16:55:22Z | - |
| dc.date.created | 2012-02-06 | - |
| dc.date.created | 2012-02-06 | - |
| dc.date.issued | 1993-06 | - |
| dc.identifier.citation | Journal of Regulatory Economics , v.5, no.2, pp.183 - 197 | - |
| dc.identifier.issn | 0922-680X | - |
| dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/10203/63710 | - |
| dc.description.abstract | This paper constructs an optimal incentive tax/subsidy scheme in an oligopoly market with pollution, as a generalization of the Loeb-Magat scheme, which is nondiscriminatory and requires less information for implementation than the conventional ones. Some interesting properties of the scheme are discussed. © 1993 Kluwer Academic Publishers. | - |
| dc.language | English | - |
| dc.publisher | Springer Netherlands | - |
| dc.title | An optimal tax/subsidy for output and pollution control under asymmetric information in oligopoly markets | - |
| dc.type | Article | - |
| dc.identifier.scopusid | 2-s2.0-21144466326 | - |
| dc.type.rims | ART | - |
| dc.citation.volume | 5 | - |
| dc.citation.issue | 2 | - |
| dc.citation.beginningpage | 183 | - |
| dc.citation.endingpage | 197 | - |
| dc.citation.publicationname | Journal of Regulatory Economics | - |
| dc.contributor.localauthor | Kim, Jae-Cheol | - |
| dc.contributor.nonIdAuthor | Kim, Jae-Cheol | - |
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