Non-discriminatory access pricing for multiple entrants

Cited 0 time in webofscience Cited 0 time in scopus
  • Hit : 516
  • Download : 36
Competing with a vertically integrated incumbent that monopolizes a vital input typically requires access to the input for the supply of final services. The possibility of anti-competitive behavior makes the pricing of access one of the most important issues in the network industries. The existence of multiple entrants seeking access creates a yet another requirement of non-discriminatory to regulatory agencies who in general cannot make discrimination between one entrant and another. The present paper aims to analyze how this non-discriminatory requirement can be dealt with in deriving the optimal access pricing rules in relation to the ECPR formulas.
Publisher
Elsevier Inc.
Issue Date
1998
Language
English
Citation

INTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF ECONOMICS AND FINANCE, v.7, no.2, pp.173 - 183

ISSN
1059-0560
URI
http://hdl.handle.net/10203/3881
Appears in Collection
MT-Journal Papers(저널논문)
Files in This Item

qr_code

  • mendeley

    citeulike


rss_1.0 rss_2.0 atom_1.0