The groupwise-pivotal referral auction: Core-selecting referral strategy-proof mechanism
| DC Field | Value | Language |
|---|---|---|
| dc.contributor.author | Jeong, Seungwon (Eugene) | ko |
| dc.contributor.author | Lee, Joosung | ko |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2024-01-16T08:00:09Z | - |
| dc.date.available | 2024-01-16T08:00:09Z | - |
| dc.date.created | 2024-01-16 | - |
| dc.date.created | 2024-01-16 | - |
| dc.date.issued | 2024-01 | - |
| dc.identifier.citation | GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR, v.143, pp.191 - 203 | - |
| dc.identifier.issn | 0899-8256 | - |
| dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/10203/317863 | - |
| dc.description.abstract | We introduce the groupwise-pivotal referral (GPR) mechanism for auctions where buyers can participate through referrals. Each buyer's type consists of a valuation and referable buyers. Unlike the second-price auction (SPA), the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism provides referral incentives. However, VCG is not budget-feasible. In contrast, under complete information, GPR is core-selecting, implying efficiency and budget feasibility. Under incomplete information, bidders refer truthfully and have no incentive to underbid in GPR. Furthermore, GPR's ex-post revenue outperforms both VCG and SPA, not just in equilibrium but also when bidders do not use weakly dominated strategies. | - |
| dc.language | English | - |
| dc.publisher | ACADEMIC PRESS INC ELSEVIER SCIENCE | - |
| dc.title | The groupwise-pivotal referral auction: Core-selecting referral strategy-proof mechanism | - |
| dc.type | Article | - |
| dc.identifier.wosid | 001133307400001 | - |
| dc.identifier.scopusid | 2-s2.0-85178125495 | - |
| dc.type.rims | ART | - |
| dc.citation.volume | 143 | - |
| dc.citation.beginningpage | 191 | - |
| dc.citation.endingpage | 203 | - |
| dc.citation.publicationname | GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR | - |
| dc.identifier.doi | 10.1016/j.geb.2023.11.012 | - |
| dc.contributor.localauthor | Jeong, Seungwon (Eugene) | - |
| dc.contributor.nonIdAuthor | Lee, Joosung | - |
| dc.description.isOpenAccess | N | - |
| dc.type.journalArticle | Article | - |
| dc.subject.keywordAuthor | Referral network | - |
| dc.subject.keywordAuthor | Referral strategy-proofness | - |
| dc.subject.keywordAuthor | Budget feasibility | - |
| dc.subject.keywordAuthor | Core | - |
| dc.subject.keywordAuthor | Shill-proofness | - |
| dc.subject.keywordAuthor | Groupwise collusion-proofness | - |
| dc.subject.keywordAuthor | Referrer&apos | - |
| dc.subject.keywordAuthor | s dilemma | - |
| dc.subject.keywordPlus | INCENTIVES | - |
| dc.subject.keywordPlus | BIDS | - |
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