How powerful CEOs adopt antitakeover provisions?
| DC Field | Value | Language |
|---|---|---|
| dc.contributor.author | Lee, Eunsuh | ko |
| dc.contributor.author | Kim, Chaehyun | ko |
| dc.contributor.author | Lee, Junyoup | ko |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2022-05-10T02:00:23Z | - |
| dc.date.available | 2022-05-10T02:00:23Z | - |
| dc.date.created | 2021-03-30 | - |
| dc.date.created | 2021-03-30 | - |
| dc.date.issued | 2022-06 | - |
| dc.identifier.citation | APPLIED ECONOMICS LETTERS, v.29, no.10, pp.910 - 914 | - |
| dc.identifier.issn | 1350-4851 | - |
| dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/10203/296464 | - |
| dc.description.abstract | We investigate how powerful chief executive officers (CEOs) adopt antitakeover provisions (ATPs). Prior studies indicate that CEOs adopt ATPs to increase their private benefits and job security. However, our evidence reveals a nonmonotonic relationship between CEO power and ATPs. Specifically, relatively less powerful CEOs adopt more ATPs, supporting the managerial entrenchment hypothesis. However, when CEOs become sufficiently powerful, they adopt fewer ATPs, supporting the quiet life hypothesis. Overall, our findings support the notion that a simple linear relationship does not explain the effect of CEO power. | - |
| dc.language | English | - |
| dc.publisher | ROUTLEDGE JOURNALS, TAYLOR & FRANCIS LTD | - |
| dc.title | How powerful CEOs adopt antitakeover provisions? | - |
| dc.type | Article | - |
| dc.identifier.wosid | 000630937500001 | - |
| dc.identifier.scopusid | 2-s2.0-85102940378 | - |
| dc.type.rims | ART | - |
| dc.citation.volume | 29 | - |
| dc.citation.issue | 10 | - |
| dc.citation.beginningpage | 910 | - |
| dc.citation.endingpage | 914 | - |
| dc.citation.publicationname | APPLIED ECONOMICS LETTERS | - |
| dc.identifier.doi | 10.1080/13504851.2021.1897510 | - |
| dc.contributor.localauthor | Kim, Chaehyun | - |
| dc.contributor.nonIdAuthor | Lee, Eunsuh | - |
| dc.contributor.nonIdAuthor | Lee, Junyoup | - |
| dc.description.isOpenAccess | N | - |
| dc.type.journalArticle | Article | - |
| dc.subject.keywordAuthor | Antitakeover provisions | - |
| dc.subject.keywordAuthor | CEO power | - |
| dc.subject.keywordAuthor | Managerial entrenchment hypothesis | - |
| dc.subject.keywordAuthor | Quiet life hypothesis | - |
- Appears in Collection
- RIMS Journal Papers
- Files in This Item
- There are no files associated with this item.
This item is cited by other documents in WoS
| ⊙ Detail Information in WoSⓡ | Click to see |  |
| ⊙ Cited 2 items in WoS | Click to see citing articles in |  |
Items in DSpace are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.