Benefit attribution in financial systems with bilateral netting

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dc.contributor.authorLim, Hanahko
dc.date.accessioned2022-04-14T06:42:39Z-
dc.date.available2022-04-14T06:42:39Z-
dc.date.created2022-03-21-
dc.date.created2022-03-21-
dc.date.created2022-03-21-
dc.date.issued2022-03-
dc.identifier.citationFINANCE RESEARCH LETTERS, v.45-
dc.identifier.issn1544-6123-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10203/292754-
dc.description.abstractWe develop a cooperative game model and apply the Shapley value to the game to attribute overall benefits of bilateral netting to individual financial institutions. We propose three differ-ent characteristic functions, each of which represents a different type of systemic importance. A simulation study shows that the benefit attribution of a bank is strongly related to the bank's interbank reliance and vulnerability.-
dc.languageEnglish-
dc.publisherACADEMIC PRESS INC ELSEVIER SCIENCE-
dc.titleBenefit attribution in financial systems with bilateral netting-
dc.typeArticle-
dc.identifier.wosid000761168200025-
dc.identifier.scopusid2-s2.0-85107669104-
dc.type.rimsART-
dc.citation.volume45-
dc.citation.publicationnameFINANCE RESEARCH LETTERS-
dc.identifier.doi10.1016/j.frl.2021.102179-
dc.description.isOpenAccessN-
dc.type.journalArticleArticle-
dc.subject.keywordAuthorBenefit attribution-
dc.subject.keywordAuthorBilateral netting-
dc.subject.keywordAuthorFinancial systemic loss-
dc.subject.keywordAuthorCooperative game theory-
dc.subject.keywordAuthorShapley value-
dc.subject.keywordPlusRISK-
dc.subject.keywordPlusALLOCATION-
dc.subject.keywordPlusMARKET-
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