DC Field | Value | Language |
---|---|---|
dc.contributor.author | Lee, Eunsuh | ko |
dc.contributor.author | Kim, Chaehyun | ko |
dc.contributor.author | Lee, Junyoup | ko |
dc.date.accessioned | 2021-01-28T05:51:20Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2021-01-28T05:51:20Z | - |
dc.date.created | 2020-03-30 | - |
dc.date.created | 2020-03-30 | - |
dc.date.issued | 2021-02 | - |
dc.identifier.citation | APPLIED ECONOMICS LETTERS, v.28, no.3, pp.186 - 190 | - |
dc.identifier.issn | 1350-4851 | - |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/10203/280006 | - |
dc.description.abstract | We examine the relationship between co-opted boards and the adoption of antitakeover provisions (ATPs). Prior studies suggest that co-opted directors appointed after the current CEO assumes office provide weak monitoring. Consistent with the substitution view, we find that firms with greater co-option on the board adopt fewer ATPs. This result suggests that co-opted boards enable CEOs to pursue less additional entrenchment, thereby reducing the adoption of ATPs. Importantly, we find that co-opted boards explain the degree of ATPs beyond the traditional measure of board monitoring effectiveness, and even independent directors are associated with fewer ATPs once they are captured by CEOs. | - |
dc.language | English | - |
dc.publisher | ROUTLEDGE JOURNALS, TAYLOR & FRANCIS LTD | - |
dc.title | Substitutes or complements? Co-opted boards and antitakeover provisions | - |
dc.type | Article | - |
dc.identifier.wosid | 000519400800001 | - |
dc.identifier.scopusid | 2-s2.0-85081408604 | - |
dc.type.rims | ART | - |
dc.citation.volume | 28 | - |
dc.citation.issue | 3 | - |
dc.citation.beginningpage | 186 | - |
dc.citation.endingpage | 190 | - |
dc.citation.publicationname | APPLIED ECONOMICS LETTERS | - |
dc.identifier.doi | 10.1080/13504851.2020.1740153 | - |
dc.contributor.localauthor | Kim, Chaehyun | - |
dc.contributor.nonIdAuthor | Lee, Eunsuh | - |
dc.contributor.nonIdAuthor | Lee, Junyoup | - |
dc.description.isOpenAccess | N | - |
dc.type.journalArticle | Article | - |
dc.subject.keywordAuthor | Co-opted boards | - |
dc.subject.keywordAuthor | co-option | - |
dc.subject.keywordAuthor | board monitoring effectiveness | - |
dc.subject.keywordAuthor | antitakeover provisions | - |
dc.subject.keywordPlus | CORPORATE GOVERNANCE | - |
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