Simple Characterizations of Potential Games and Zero-sum Equivalent Games

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We provide several tests to determine whether a game is a potential game or whether it is a zero-sum equivalent game—a game which is strategically equivalent to a zero-sum game in the same way that a potential game is strategically equivalent to a common interest game. We present a unified framework applica-ble for both potential and zero-sum equivalent games by deriving a simple but useful characterization of these games. This allows us to re-derive known criteria for potential games, as well as obtain several new criteria. In particular, we prove (1) new integral tests for potential games and for zero-sum equivalent games, (2) a new derivative test for zero-sum equivalent games, and (3) a new representation characterization for zero-sum equivalent games.
Publisher
Korean Econometric Society
Issue Date
2020-03
Language
English
Citation

Journal of Economic Theory and Econometrics, v.31, no.1, pp.1 - 13

ISSN
1229-2893
DOI
10.22812/jetem.2020.31.1.001
URI
http://hdl.handle.net/10203/275942
Appears in Collection
MT-Journal Papers(저널논문)
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