DC Field | Value | Language |
---|---|---|
dc.contributor.author | Kim, Seongkwang | ko |
dc.contributor.author | Lee, Byeonghak | ko |
dc.contributor.author | Lee, Jooyoung | ko |
dc.date.accessioned | 2020-06-11T01:20:28Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2020-06-11T01:20:28Z | - |
dc.date.created | 2020-06-10 | - |
dc.date.created | 2020-06-10 | - |
dc.date.created | 2020-06-10 | - |
dc.date.issued | 2020-05-13 | - |
dc.identifier.citation | 39th Annual International Conference on the Theory and Applications of Cryptographic Techniques, EUROCRYPT 2020, pp.435 - 465 | - |
dc.identifier.issn | 0302-9743 | - |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/10203/274606 | - |
dc.description.abstract | In this work, we study the security of deterministic MAC constructions with a double-block internal state, captured by the double-block hash-then-sum ( \(\mathsf {DbHtS}\) ) paradigm. Most \(\mathsf {DbHtS}\) constructions, including \(\mathsf {PolyMAC}\) , \(\mathsf {SUM\text {-}ECBC}\) , \(\mathsf {PMAC\text {-}Plus}\) , \(\mathsf {3kf9}\) and \(\mathsf {LightMAC\text {-}Plus}\) , have been proved to be pseudorandom up to \(2^{\frac{2n}{3}}\) queries when they are instantiated with an n-bit block cipher, while the best known generic attacks require \(2^{\frac{3n}{4}}\) queries. We close this gap by proving the PRF-security of \(\mathsf {DbHtS}\) constructions up to \(2^{\frac{3n}{4}}\) queries (ignoring the maximum message length). The core of the security proof is to refine Mirror theory that systematically estimates the number of solutions to a system of equations and non-equations, and apply it to prove the security of the finalization function. Then we identify security requirements of the internal hash functions to ensure 3n/4-bit security of the resulting constructions when combined with the finalization function. Within this framework, we prove the security of \(\mathsf {DbHtS}\) whose internal hash function is given as the concatenation of a universal hash function using two independent keys. This class of constructions include \(\mathsf {PolyMAC}\) and \(\mathsf {SUM\text {-}ECBC}\) . Moreover, we prove the security of \(\mathsf {PMAC\text {-}Plus}\) , \(\mathsf {3kf9}\) and \(\mathsf {LightMAC\text {-}Plus}\) up to \(2^{\frac{3n}{4}}\) queries. | - |
dc.language | English | - |
dc.publisher | Springer International Publishing | - |
dc.title | Tight Security Bounds for Double-Block Hash-then-Sum MACs | - |
dc.type | Conference | - |
dc.identifier.wosid | 000591516700016 | - |
dc.identifier.scopusid | 2-s2.0-85090013053 | - |
dc.type.rims | CONF | - |
dc.citation.beginningpage | 435 | - |
dc.citation.endingpage | 465 | - |
dc.citation.publicationname | 39th Annual International Conference on the Theory and Applications of Cryptographic Techniques, EUROCRYPT 2020 | - |
dc.identifier.conferencecountry | CT | - |
dc.identifier.conferencelocation | Virtual | - |
dc.identifier.doi | 10.1007/978-3-030-45721-1_16 | - |
dc.contributor.localauthor | Lee, Jooyoung | - |
dc.contributor.nonIdAuthor | Kim, Seongkwang | - |
dc.contributor.nonIdAuthor | Lee, Byeonghak | - |
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