DC Field | Value | Language |
---|---|---|
dc.contributor.author | Shin, Euncheol | ko |
dc.date.accessioned | 2019-12-13T01:25:12Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2019-12-13T01:25:12Z | - |
dc.date.created | 2019-12-09 | - |
dc.date.created | 2019-12-09 | - |
dc.date.created | 2019-12-09 | - |
dc.date.issued | 2019-11 | - |
dc.identifier.citation | GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR, v.118, pp.463 - 485 | - |
dc.identifier.issn | 0899-8256 | - |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/10203/268811 | - |
dc.description.abstract | In many countries, three or more candidates compete against one another in single-office elections. I present a model of three candidates competing for a single office in which two candidates can form a coalition prior to the election (a pre-electoral coalition). Since the candidates are both policy- and office-motivated, one candidate can incentivize the other candidate to withdraw his candidacy by choosing a joint policy platform. I examine how electoral environments such as election rules, ideological distance, and pre-election polls influence incentives to form pre-electoral coalitions. I find that pre-electoral coalitions are more likely to form (i) in plurality elections than in two-round runoff elections, (ii) as the threshold for first-round victory decreases in two-round runoff elections, (iii) as the two potential coalition partners' ideological distance increases, conditional on divided support, and (iv) as the fraction of office value which is transferable increases. Moreover, I analyze and compare voter welfare under plurality and the two-round runoff rules. | - |
dc.language | English | - |
dc.publisher | ACADEMIC PRESS INC ELSEVIER SCIENCE | - |
dc.title | A model of pre-electoral coalition formation | - |
dc.type | Article | - |
dc.identifier.wosid | 000506466300027 | - |
dc.identifier.scopusid | 2-s2.0-85044323140 | - |
dc.type.rims | ART | - |
dc.citation.volume | 118 | - |
dc.citation.beginningpage | 463 | - |
dc.citation.endingpage | 485 | - |
dc.citation.publicationname | GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR | - |
dc.identifier.doi | 10.1016/j.geb.2018.01.001 | - |
dc.contributor.localauthor | Shin, Euncheol | - |
dc.description.isOpenAccess | N | - |
dc.type.journalArticle | Article | - |
dc.subject.keywordAuthor | Opinion polls | - |
dc.subject.keywordAuthor | Plurality rule | - |
dc.subject.keywordAuthor | Pre-electoral coalition | - |
dc.subject.keywordAuthor | Strategic voting | - |
dc.subject.keywordAuthor | Two-round runoff rules | - |
Items in DSpace are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.