DC Field | Value | Language |
---|---|---|
dc.contributor.author | Hwang, Sung-Ha | ko |
dc.contributor.author | Lim, Wooyoung | ko |
dc.contributor.author | Neary, Philip | ko |
dc.contributor.author | Newton, Jonathan | ko |
dc.date.accessioned | 2018-08-20T08:08:32Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2018-08-20T08:08:32Z | - |
dc.date.created | 2018-06-30 | - |
dc.date.created | 2018-06-30 | - |
dc.date.issued | 2018-07 | - |
dc.identifier.citation | GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR, v.110, pp.273 - 294 | - |
dc.identifier.issn | 0899-8256 | - |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/10203/244985 | - |
dc.description.abstract | When coordination games are played under the logit choice rule and there is intentional bias in agents' non-best response behavior, we show that the Egalitarian bargaining solution emerges as the long run social norm. Without intentional bias, a new solution, the Logit bargaining solution emerges as the long run norm. These results contrast with results under non-payoff dependent deviations from best response behavior, where it has previously been shown that the Kalai-Smorodinsky and Nash bargaining solutions emerge as long run norms. We complement the theory with experiments on human subjects, results of which suggest that non-best response play is payoff dependent and displays intentional bias. This suggests the Egalitarian solution as the most likely candidate for a long run bargaining norm. (C) 2018 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved. | - |
dc.language | English | - |
dc.publisher | ACADEMIC PRESS INC ELSEVIER SCIENCE | - |
dc.subject | NASHS BARGAINING PROBLEM | - |
dc.subject | STOCHASTIC STABILITY | - |
dc.subject | EQUILIBRIUM SELECTION | - |
dc.subject | COORDINATION GAMES | - |
dc.subject | COOPERATIVE GAMES | - |
dc.subject | DYNAMICS | - |
dc.subject | UTILITARIAN | - |
dc.subject | EGALITARIAN | - |
dc.title | Conventional contracts, intentional behavior and logit choice: Equality without symmetry | - |
dc.type | Article | - |
dc.identifier.wosid | 000439683400017 | - |
dc.identifier.scopusid | 2-s2.0-85048023368 | - |
dc.type.rims | ART | - |
dc.citation.volume | 110 | - |
dc.citation.beginningpage | 273 | - |
dc.citation.endingpage | 294 | - |
dc.citation.publicationname | GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR | - |
dc.identifier.doi | 10.1016/j.geb.2018.05.002 | - |
dc.contributor.localauthor | Hwang, Sung-Ha | - |
dc.contributor.nonIdAuthor | Lim, Wooyoung | - |
dc.contributor.nonIdAuthor | Neary, Philip | - |
dc.contributor.nonIdAuthor | Newton, Jonathan | - |
dc.description.isOpenAccess | N | - |
dc.type.journalArticle | Article | - |
dc.subject.keywordAuthor | Evolution | - |
dc.subject.keywordAuthor | Nash program | - |
dc.subject.keywordAuthor | Logit choice | - |
dc.subject.keywordAuthor | Egalitarianism | - |
dc.subject.keywordPlus | NASHS BARGAINING PROBLEM | - |
dc.subject.keywordPlus | STOCHASTIC STABILITY | - |
dc.subject.keywordPlus | EQUILIBRIUM SELECTION | - |
dc.subject.keywordPlus | COORDINATION GAMES | - |
dc.subject.keywordPlus | COOPERATIVE GAMES | - |
dc.subject.keywordPlus | DYNAMICS | - |
dc.subject.keywordPlus | UTILITARIAN | - |
dc.subject.keywordPlus | EGALITARIAN | - |
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