Evolutionary bargaining with intentional idiosyncratic play

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We study equilibrium selection in stochastic evolutionary bargaining games in which idiosyncratic play is intentional instead of random. In contract games, the stochastically stable state selected by intentional idiosyncratic play is the Nash bargain, rather than the usual Kalai-Smorodinsky solution. (C) 2010 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
Publisher
ELSEVIER SCIENCE SA
Issue Date
2010-10
Language
English
Article Type
Article
Citation

ECONOMICS LETTERS, v.109, no.1, pp.31 - 33

ISSN
0165-1765
DOI
10.1016/j.econlet.2010.07.005
URI
http://hdl.handle.net/10203/219704
Appears in Collection
MT-Journal Papers(저널논문)
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