Evolutionary bargaining with intentional idiosyncratic play
We study equilibrium selection in stochastic evolutionary bargaining games in which idiosyncratic play is intentional instead of random. In contract games, the stochastically stable state selected by intentional idiosyncratic play is the Nash bargain, rather than the usual Kalai-Smorodinsky solution. (C) 2010 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
- Publisher
- ELSEVIER SCIENCE SA
- Issue Date
- 2010-10
- Language
- English
- Article Type
- Article
- Citation
ECONOMICS LETTERS, v.109, no.1, pp.31 - 33
- ISSN
- 0165-1765
- Appears in Collection
- MT-Journal Papers(저널논문)
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