A group bargaining solution

Cited 29 time in webofscience Cited 0 time in scopus
  • Hit : 520
  • Download : 0
We propose a solution for bargaining models where groups of individuals bargain with each other. The solution constitutes a Nash solution within as well as across groups. An individual may be worse off bargaining as a member of a group than bargaining alone (the joint-bargaining paradox) in a pure-bargaining situation. It can be, however, profitable to bargain as a group in a non-pure bargaining situation. (C) 2004 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
Publisher
ELSEVIER SCIENCE BV
Issue Date
2004-07
Language
English
Article Type
Article
Keywords

EQUILIBRIUM

Citation

MATHEMATICAL SOCIAL SCIENCES, v.48, no.1, pp.37 - 53

ISSN
0165-4896
DOI
10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2003.11.002
URI
http://hdl.handle.net/10203/79330
Appears in Collection
MG-Journal Papers(저널논문)
Files in This Item
There are no files associated with this item.
This item is cited by other documents in WoS
⊙ Detail Information in WoSⓡ Click to see webofscience_button
⊙ Cited 29 items in WoS Click to see citing articles in records_button

qr_code

  • mendeley

    citeulike


rss_1.0 rss_2.0 atom_1.0