The engineered safeguards of Wolsung nuclear power plant unit 1 contain redundant systems of 2-out-of-3 logic which are not operating under normal conditions but are called upon to act when emergency conditions develop. To ensure their operability, the systems are periodically tested. In this work, we develop the unavailability formulae for 2-out-of-3 logic configurations which take into account the failure probability of the channels tested due to human error in the simultaneous testing scheme. We also develop the model for the probability that the reactor is tripped during the surveillance test due to either system failure or human error. We determined the optimal inspection periods of safety systems, taking into account both the unavailability of the safety system and the probability that the reactor is tripped during the surveillance test. We compared the results with the inspection periods currently used at Wolsung NPP Unit 1. As a result, the inspection periods obtained using a minimum human error (8.24 x 1-6 ) are shorter than those currently used in Wolsung NPP unit 1 whereas the inspection periods obtained using a maximum human error are (4.44 x 10-4 ) longer than those used in Wolsung NPP unit 1.