DC Field | Value | Language |
---|---|---|
dc.contributor.author | Chae, Suchan | ko |
dc.contributor.author | Song, Jaehee | ko |
dc.date.accessioned | 2017-12-19T00:58:35Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2017-12-19T00:58:35Z | - |
dc.date.created | 2017-11-28 | - |
dc.date.created | 2017-11-28 | - |
dc.date.created | 2017-11-28 | - |
dc.date.issued | 2017-11 | - |
dc.identifier.citation | MATHEMATICAL SOCIAL SCIENCES, v.90, pp.63 - 72 | - |
dc.identifier.issn | 0165-4896 | - |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/10203/228449 | - |
dc.description.abstract | We study price competition between heterogeneous matchmakers in a two-sided matching market. It is well known that when two passive matchmakers who provide random matching services compete with entrance fees, there exists no pure-strategy equilibrium. We show that when a passive matchmaker and an active matchmaker, who provides an assortive matching service, compete with entrance fees, there exists a pure-strategy equilibrium. We also provide welfare comparison between the duopoly and a monopoly operating both the passive and active networks. | - |
dc.language | English | - |
dc.publisher | ELSEVIER SCIENCE BV | - |
dc.title | Price competition between random and assortive matchmakers | - |
dc.type | Article | - |
dc.identifier.wosid | 000414878000009 | - |
dc.identifier.scopusid | 2-s2.0-85028475442 | - |
dc.type.rims | ART | - |
dc.citation.volume | 90 | - |
dc.citation.beginningpage | 63 | - |
dc.citation.endingpage | 72 | - |
dc.citation.publicationname | MATHEMATICAL SOCIAL SCIENCES | - |
dc.identifier.doi | 10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2017.06.003 | - |
dc.contributor.localauthor | Chae, Suchan | - |
dc.contributor.nonIdAuthor | Song, Jaehee | - |
dc.description.isOpenAccess | N | - |
dc.type.journalArticle | Article | - |
dc.subject.keywordPlus | BARGAINING MODEL | - |
dc.subject.keywordPlus | REAL-ESTATE | - |
dc.subject.keywordPlus | SEARCH | - |
dc.subject.keywordPlus | MARKETS | - |
dc.subject.keywordPlus | STABILITY | - |
dc.subject.keywordPlus | MARRIAGE | - |
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