Aligning benefits with payments: A test of the pattern alignment hypothesis

Cited 8 time in webofscience Cited 0 time in scopus
  • Hit : 469
  • Download : 0
This article examines consumer perception of transactions whose benefits Of Consumption and cost of purchase unfold over time. Specifically, the article employs the notion of narrow framing to suggest that, when consumers confront a series of decisions, they tend to make evaluations one at a time, rather than take into consideration the entire portfolio. Consistent with this argument, the authors test the pattern alignment hypothesis, which states that consumers prefer payment schemes that match the pattern of benefits and payments in each period, rather than a scheme that encompasses ail entire financing period. In two experiments, the authors find general support for the pattern alignment hypothesis and for the underlying process by which this hypothesis occurs. Specifically, Experiment 2 highlights the mediating role of consumers' perceived fairness in determining the effectiveness of a financing program. The paper Concludes with a discussion of the theoretical and practical implications of developing financing and pricing strategies that promote the perception of fairness. (C) 2008 Society for Consumer Psychology. Published by Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
Publisher
ELSEVIER SCIENCE INC
Issue Date
2008
Language
English
Article Type
Article
Keywords

CONSTRUAL LEVEL THEORY; DECISION-MAKING; CONSUMER PERCEPTIONS; PRICE; SATISFACTION; CONSUMPTION; CUSTOMERS; BEHAVIOR; RISK; CONSEQUENCES

Citation

JOURNAL OF CONSUMER PSYCHOLOGY, v.18, no.4, pp.292 - 303

ISSN
1057-7408
URI
http://hdl.handle.net/10203/91898
Appears in Collection
MT-Journal Papers(저널논문)
Files in This Item
There are no files associated with this item.
This item is cited by other documents in WoS
⊙ Detail Information in WoSⓡ Click to see webofscience_button
⊙ Cited 8 items in WoS Click to see citing articles in records_button

qr_code

  • mendeley

    citeulike


rss_1.0 rss_2.0 atom_1.0