A note on multi-issue bargaining with a finite set of alternatives

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dc.contributor.authorIn, Younghwanko
dc.date.accessioned2013-03-07T06:58:49Z-
dc.date.available2013-03-07T06:58:49Z-
dc.date.created2012-02-06-
dc.date.created2012-02-06-
dc.date.issued2006-04-
dc.identifier.citationINTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF GAME THEORY, v.34, no.1, pp.79 - 90-
dc.identifier.issn0020-7276-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10203/89649-
dc.description.abstractWe extend the results of van Damme et al. (1990) and Muthoo (1991) to two bilateral multi-issue bargaining procedures with complete information and endogenous agenda, where each issue is associated with a finite set of alternatives. We show that in the first procedure (issue-by-issue bargaining), the stationary subgame perfect equilibria alone may support a large multiplicity of inefficient agreements. Confronting a recent study, the results for the second procedure imply that it is not necessary to appeal to "strictly controversial" issues in a bargaining problem in order to find multiplicity and delay in agreements.-
dc.languageEnglish-
dc.publisherPHYSICA-VERLAG GMBH CO-
dc.subjectAGENDA RESTRICTIONS-
dc.subjectEQUILIBRIA-
dc.subjectMODEL-
dc.titleA note on multi-issue bargaining with a finite set of alternatives-
dc.typeArticle-
dc.identifier.wosid000236830900006-
dc.identifier.scopusid2-s2.0-33645788885-
dc.type.rimsART-
dc.citation.volume34-
dc.citation.issue1-
dc.citation.beginningpage79-
dc.citation.endingpage90-
dc.citation.publicationnameINTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF GAME THEORY-
dc.identifier.doi10.1007/s00182-005-0001-6-
dc.embargo.liftdate9999-12-31-
dc.embargo.terms9999-12-31-
dc.contributor.localauthorIn, Younghwan-
dc.type.journalArticleArticle-
dc.subject.keywordAuthormulti-issue bargaining-
dc.subject.keywordAuthorfiniteness-
dc.subject.keywordAuthorcomplete information-
dc.subject.keywordAuthorinefficiency and delay-
dc.subject.keywordPlusAGENDA RESTRICTIONS-
dc.subject.keywordPlusEQUILIBRIA-
dc.subject.keywordPlusMODEL-
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