A note on multi-issue bargaining with a finite set of alternatives

Cited 0 time in webofscience Cited 0 time in scopus
  • Hit : 529
  • Download : 105
We extend the results of van Damme et al. (1990) and Muthoo (1991) to two bilateral multi-issue bargaining procedures with complete information and endogenous agenda, where each issue is associated with a finite set of alternatives. We show that in the first procedure (issue-by-issue bargaining), the stationary subgame perfect equilibria alone may support a large multiplicity of inefficient agreements. Confronting a recent study, the results for the second procedure imply that it is not necessary to appeal to "strictly controversial" issues in a bargaining problem in order to find multiplicity and delay in agreements.
Publisher
PHYSICA-VERLAG GMBH CO
Issue Date
2006-04
Language
English
Article Type
Article
Keywords

AGENDA RESTRICTIONS; EQUILIBRIA; MODEL

Citation

INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF GAME THEORY, v.34, no.1, pp.79 - 90

ISSN
0020-7276
DOI
10.1007/s00182-005-0001-6
URI
http://hdl.handle.net/10203/89649
Appears in Collection
MT-Journal Papers(저널논문)
Files in This Item

qr_code

  • mendeley

    citeulike


rss_1.0 rss_2.0 atom_1.0