Zero pricing in ICT bundle offers: does it reinforce or weaken anticompetitive effects?

Abstract

Marketers and antitrust practitioners have long raised concerns regarding market power abuses through bundling in the Information and Communication Technology (ICT) industry. Anticompetitive issues can arise if marketdominant operators frame bundle discounts as "free" offers (i.e., zero-price marketing)-a topic still underexplored in the literature. While research on consumer behavior around free offers in bundles exists, it remains unclear if zero-pricing strengthens or weakens anticompetitive effects. We developed a theoretical model of bundling across different competition levels and empirically tested consumer preferences for zero-priced bundles using a conjoint experiment. Consistent with strategic foreclosure theory, we found that market-dominant operators can increase their pay-TV market share through zero-price marketing. Economically vulnerable consumers are particularly susceptible to these offers. Moreover, bundles often have hidden costs, such as long-term contracts, leading to potential lock-in effects. These findings suggest the need for regulatory attention to zeroprice marketing in bundles.