Signal Exaggeration in Bayesian Persuasion

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dc.contributor.authorLee, JaeYunko
dc.contributor.authorIn, Younghwanko
dc.date.accessioned2024-01-02T08:01:57Z-
dc.date.available2024-01-02T08:01:57Z-
dc.date.created2024-01-01-
dc.date.issued2023-07-25-
dc.identifier.citation34th Stony Brook International Conference on Game Theory-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10203/317213-
dc.languageEnglish-
dc.publisherStony Brook Center for Game Theory-
dc.titleSignal Exaggeration in Bayesian Persuasion-
dc.typeConference-
dc.type.rimsCONF-
dc.citation.publicationname34th Stony Brook International Conference on Game Theory-
dc.identifier.conferencecountryUS-
dc.identifier.conferencelocationStony Brook University, Stony Brook, New York-
dc.contributor.localauthorIn, Younghwan-
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MT-Conference Papers(학술회의논문)
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