The blind power: Power-led CEO overconfidence and M&A decision making

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dc.contributor.authorHwang, Hyoseok (David)ko
dc.contributor.authorKim, Hyun-Dongko
dc.contributor.authorKim, Taeyeonko
dc.date.accessioned2021-03-26T03:32:30Z-
dc.date.available2021-03-26T03:32:30Z-
dc.date.created2020-05-06-
dc.date.issued2020-04-
dc.identifier.citationNORTH AMERICAN JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS AND FINANCE, v.52-
dc.identifier.issn1062-9408-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10203/282061-
dc.description.abstractThe behavioral finance literature attributes failed M&As to CEO overconfidence. We investigate the source of CEO overconfidence that leads to failed M&As. Among various determinants of CEO overconfidence, we propose that power-led CEO overconfidence delivers undesirable consequences in corporate investments. Using CEO-level data, we find that CEO power increases the probability of a CEO being overconfident. We also show that power-led overconfident CEOs tend to complete more deals regardless of economic circumstances, do stock acquisitions, and make diversifying acquisitions, relative to non-overconfident CEOs. The results suggest that the findings of previous studies on M&As by overconfident CEOs could be driven by power-led overconfident CEOs.-
dc.languageEnglish-
dc.publisherELSEVIER SCIENCE INC-
dc.titleThe blind power: Power-led CEO overconfidence and M&A decision making-
dc.typeArticle-
dc.identifier.wosid000526121400014-
dc.identifier.scopusid2-s2.0-85077363777-
dc.type.rimsART-
dc.citation.volume52-
dc.citation.publicationnameNORTH AMERICAN JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS AND FINANCE-
dc.identifier.doi10.1016/j.najef.2019.101141-
dc.contributor.nonIdAuthorHwang, Hyoseok (David)-
dc.contributor.nonIdAuthorKim, Hyun-Dong-
dc.description.isOpenAccessN-
dc.type.journalArticleArticle-
dc.subject.keywordAuthorCEO overconfidence-
dc.subject.keywordAuthorCEO power-
dc.subject.keywordAuthorMergers and acquisitions-
dc.subject.keywordAuthorCorporate governance-
dc.subject.keywordPlusSELF-SERVING BIASES-
dc.subject.keywordPlusCORPORATE DIVERSIFICATION-
dc.subject.keywordPlusAGENCY COSTS-
dc.subject.keywordPlusFIRM-
dc.subject.keywordPlusCOMPENSATION-
dc.subject.keywordPlusACQUISITIONS-
dc.subject.keywordPlusATTRIBUTION-
dc.subject.keywordPlusGOVERNANCE-
dc.subject.keywordPlusPERFORMANCE-
dc.subject.keywordPlusCONTRACTS-
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