Substitutes or complements? Co-opted boards and antitakeover provisions

Cited 0 time in webofscience Cited 0 time in scopus
  • Hit : 60
  • Download : 0
We examine the relationship between co-opted boards and the adoption of antitakeover provisions (ATPs). Prior studies suggest that co-opted directors appointed after the current CEO assumes office provide weak monitoring. Consistent with the substitution view, we find that firms with greater co-option on the board adopt fewer ATPs. This result suggests that co-opted boards enable CEOs to pursue less additional entrenchment, thereby reducing the adoption of ATPs. Importantly, we find that co-opted boards explain the degree of ATPs beyond the traditional measure of board monitoring effectiveness, and even independent directors are associated with fewer ATPs once they are captured by CEOs.
Publisher
ROUTLEDGE JOURNALS, TAYLOR & FRANCIS LTD
Issue Date
2021-02
Language
English
Article Type
Article
Citation

APPLIED ECONOMICS LETTERS, v.28, no.3, pp.186 - 190

ISSN
1350-4851
DOI
10.1080/13504851.2020.1740153
URI
http://hdl.handle.net/10203/280006
Appears in Collection
RIMS Journal Papers
Files in This Item
There are no files associated with this item.

qr_code

  • mendeley

    citeulike


rss_1.0 rss_2.0 atom_1.0