THE POTENTIALLY NEGATIVE EFFECTS OF COOPERATION IN SERVICE SYSTEMS

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dc.contributor.authorChung, Hakjinko
dc.contributor.authorAhn, Hyun-Sooko
dc.contributor.authorRighter, Rhondako
dc.date.accessioned2020-05-20T09:20:11Z-
dc.date.available2020-05-20T09:20:11Z-
dc.date.created2020-05-18-
dc.date.created2020-05-18-
dc.date.issued2020-03-
dc.identifier.citationADVANCES IN APPLIED PROBABILITY, v.52, no.1, pp.319 - 347-
dc.identifier.issn0001-8678-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10203/274246-
dc.description.abstractThe 'Price of Anarchy' states that the performance of multi-agent service systems degrades with the agents' selfishness (anarchy). We investigate a service model in which both customers and the firm are strategic. We find that, for a Stackelberg game in which the server invests in capacity before customers decide whether or not to join, there can be a 'Benefit of Anarchy', that is, customers acting selfishly can have a greater overall utility than customers who are coordinated to maximize their overall utility. We also show that customer anarchy can be socially beneficial, resulting in a 'Social Benefit of Anarchy'. We show that such phenomena are rather general and can arise in multiple settings (e.g. in both profit-maximizing and welfare-maximizing firms, in both capacity-setting and price-setting firms, and in both observable and unobservable queues). However, the underlying mechanism leading to the Benefit of Anarchy can differ significantly from one setting to another.-
dc.languageEnglish-
dc.publisherAPPLIED PROBABILITY TRUST-
dc.titleTHE POTENTIALLY NEGATIVE EFFECTS OF COOPERATION IN SERVICE SYSTEMS-
dc.typeArticle-
dc.identifier.wosid000530196600011-
dc.identifier.scopusid2-s2.0-85084156170-
dc.type.rimsART-
dc.citation.volume52-
dc.citation.issue1-
dc.citation.beginningpage319-
dc.citation.endingpage347-
dc.citation.publicationnameADVANCES IN APPLIED PROBABILITY-
dc.identifier.doi10.1017/apr.2019.64-
dc.contributor.localauthorChung, Hakjin-
dc.contributor.nonIdAuthorAhn, Hyun-Soo-
dc.contributor.nonIdAuthorRighter, Rhonda-
dc.description.isOpenAccessN-
dc.type.journalArticleArticle-
dc.subject.keywordAuthorQueueing-
dc.subject.keywordAuthorPrice of Anarchy-
dc.subject.keywordAuthorbalking-
dc.subject.keywordAuthorindividual versus social welfare-
dc.subject.keywordPlusSOCIAL OPTIMIZATION-
dc.subject.keywordPlusANARCHY-
dc.subject.keywordPlusPRICE-
dc.subject.keywordPlusQUEUES-
dc.subject.keywordPlusRULES-
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