Going-concern opinion, firm investment policies, and executive compensation structure = 계속 기업 의견, 기업 투자 정책 그리고 경영자 보상

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dc.contributor.advisorHan, Ingoo-
dc.contributor.authorYoon, Na-Young-
dc.description학위논문(박사) - 한국과학기술원 : 경영공학부, 2018.2,[iii, 75 p. :]-
dc.description.abstractThis study examines whether and how inside debts affect auditors’ going-concern opinions. Regarding inside debt, there exists two competing theories. Since inside debts are recorded as liabilities, and become unpayable after bankruptcy, CEOs have incentive to manage their firms conservatively and avoid going bankruptcies. If auditors understand such incentive, they would be less likely to issue negative going-concern opinions for CEOs’ awarded retirement plans. On the other hand, some researchers concern about the rent-extraction incentives of higher inside debt holdings. Further, lump-sum options and equity-like characteristics of retirement plan induce auditors issue negative going-concern opinion for CEO with higher inside debt. I find that auditors are more likely to issue negative going-concern opinions for firms that provide their CEOs with pension plans. The results support the latter view on inside debt. Overall, the results suggest that auditors concern about large amounts of retirement plan, and conservatively react to non-risk averse traits of inside debts. Second, this study examines the impact of CEO inside debt holdings on firm investment policies, according to the components of an inside debt proxy. Most papers examining CEO inside debt employ the sum of pension plans and non-qualified deferred compensation (NQDC) plans as a proxy for CEO inside debt, without full understanding of the specific characteristics of each compensation plan. I posit how each CEO compensation plan affects firm investment policies and overinvestment. Specifically, I divide the typical proxy of CEO inside debt into CEO pension leverage, which only incorporates the balance of the pension plan in the proxy statement, and CEO deferred leverage, which consists of NQDC plans. Due to the different aspects of these two compensation plans, I predict that CEO pension leverage is negatively associated with firm investment policies as predicted in risk-averse theory, but non-qualified deferred compensation plans are positively associated with investment policies, especially when CEO leverage is higher than firm leverage. The results imply that it is necessary to distinguish the distinct characteristics of each pension plan and NQDC plan for research of inside debt.-
dc.subjectInside debt▼agoing-concern opinion▼apension plan▼adeferred compensation plan▼ainvestment policy-
dc.subject내부부채▼a계속기업의견▼a경영자 연금 제도▼a이연보상 제도▼a기업 투자 정책-
dc.titleGoing-concern opinion, firm investment policies, and executive compensation structure = 계속 기업 의견, 기업 투자 정책 그리고 경영자 보상-
dc.description.department한국과학기술원 :경영공학부,-
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