DC Field | Value | Language |
---|---|---|
dc.contributor.author | Chae, Suchan | ko |
dc.contributor.author | Kim, Seho | ko |
dc.date.accessioned | 2019-06-12T08:30:13Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2019-06-12T08:30:13Z | - |
dc.date.created | 2019-06-12 | - |
dc.date.created | 2019-06-12 | - |
dc.date.created | 2019-06-12 | - |
dc.date.issued | 2019-03 | - |
dc.identifier.citation | INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF GAME THEORY, v.48, no.1, pp.143 - 155 | - |
dc.identifier.issn | 0020-7276 | - |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/10203/262588 | - |
dc.description.abstract | We analyze a bargaining game where an anchor player bargains sequentially with n non-anchor players over the division of a pie in the presence of third-party transfers and show that there exists a unique perfect equilibrium. A lump-sum transfer is jointly shared by all players, while a transfer proportional to a player's share affects only the party that has to make that transfer. When lump-sum transfers are zero, the anchor player and each non-anchor player bargain as if there is no further bargaining. It turns out that the anchor player and the last non-anchor player are in the most disadvantageous position with our bargaining protocol. | - |
dc.language | English | - |
dc.publisher | SPRINGER HEIDELBERG | - |
dc.title | The effects of third-party transfers in sequential anchored bargaining | - |
dc.type | Article | - |
dc.identifier.wosid | 000468538600006 | - |
dc.identifier.scopusid | 2-s2.0-85059053974 | - |
dc.type.rims | ART | - |
dc.citation.volume | 48 | - |
dc.citation.issue | 1 | - |
dc.citation.beginningpage | 143 | - |
dc.citation.endingpage | 155 | - |
dc.citation.publicationname | INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF GAME THEORY | - |
dc.identifier.doi | 10.1007/s00182-018-00657-x | - |
dc.contributor.localauthor | Chae, Suchan | - |
dc.contributor.nonIdAuthor | Kim, Seho | - |
dc.description.isOpenAccess | Y | - |
dc.type.journalArticle | Article | - |
dc.subject.keywordAuthor | Sequential bargaining | - |
dc.subject.keywordAuthor | Anchored bargaining | - |
dc.subject.keywordAuthor | Tax incidence | - |
dc.subject.keywordPlus | PERFECT EQUILIBRIUM | - |
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