Do long-term institutional investors promote corporate social responsibility activities?

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dc.contributor.authorKim, Hyun-Dongko
dc.contributor.authorKim, Taeyeonko
dc.contributor.authorKim, Yurako
dc.contributor.authorPark, Kwangwooko
dc.date.accessioned2019-04-24T13:13:28Z-
dc.date.available2019-04-24T13:13:28Z-
dc.date.created2019-04-22-
dc.date.issued2019-04-
dc.identifier.citationJOURNAL OF BANKING & FINANCE, v.101, pp.256 - 269-
dc.identifier.issn0378-4266-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10203/261486-
dc.description.abstractThis paper examines how the investment horizons of a firm's institutional investors affect its corporate social responsibility (CSR) activities. Using data on U.S. firms' CSR ratings over the 1995-2012 period, we find that longer investment horizons are positively related to CSR. Further, active long-term institutions increase CSR whereas passive long-term institutions have no significant effect. Our results suggest that investors with long-term horizons have more incentives to monitor their firms which leads managers to engage in more vigorous CSR activities. (C) 2019 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.-
dc.languageEnglish-
dc.publisherELSEVIER SCIENCE BV-
dc.titleDo long-term institutional investors promote corporate social responsibility activities?-
dc.typeArticle-
dc.identifier.wosid000463297100018-
dc.identifier.scopusid2-s2.0-85059521159-
dc.type.rimsART-
dc.citation.volume101-
dc.citation.beginningpage256-
dc.citation.endingpage269-
dc.citation.publicationnameJOURNAL OF BANKING & FINANCE-
dc.identifier.doi10.1016/j.jbankfin.2018.11.015-
dc.contributor.localauthorPark, Kwangwoo-
dc.contributor.nonIdAuthorKim, Hyun-Dong-
dc.contributor.nonIdAuthorKim, Yura-
dc.description.isOpenAccessN-
dc.type.journalArticleArticle-
dc.subject.keywordAuthorCorporate social responsibility (CSR)-
dc.subject.keywordAuthorInstitutional investor-
dc.subject.keywordAuthorInvestment horizon-
dc.subject.keywordAuthorMonitoring incentive-
dc.subject.keywordPlusFINANCIAL PERFORMANCE-
dc.subject.keywordPlusINVESTMENT HORIZONS-
dc.subject.keywordPlusSTAKEHOLDER THEORY-
dc.subject.keywordPlusSTOCK RETURNS-
dc.subject.keywordPlusCROSS-SECTION-
dc.subject.keywordPlusAGENCY COSTS-
dc.subject.keywordPlusGOVERNANCE-
dc.subject.keywordPlusOWNERSHIP-
dc.subject.keywordPlusMANAGEMENT-
dc.subject.keywordPlusMATTERS-
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