SGX-LEGO: Fine-grained SGX controlled-channel attack and its countermeasure

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dc.contributor.authorKim, Deokjinko
dc.contributor.authorJang, Daeheeko
dc.contributor.authorPark, Minjoonko
dc.contributor.authorJeong, Yunjongko
dc.contributor.authorKim, Jonghwanko
dc.contributor.authorChoi, Seokjinko
dc.contributor.authorKang, Brent Byunghoonko
dc.date.accessioned2019-03-19T01:49:01Z-
dc.date.available2019-03-19T01:49:01Z-
dc.date.created2019-03-11-
dc.date.created2019-03-11-
dc.date.issued2019-05-
dc.identifier.citationCOMPUTERS & SECURITY, v.82, pp.118 - 139-
dc.identifier.issn0167-4048-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10203/251758-
dc.description.abstractThe introduction of Intel Software Guard eXtension (SGX) prompted security researchers to verify its effectiveness. One of the frequently discussed attacks against SGX is the side-channel attack by gathering page-fault information (controlled-channel attack). Owing to SGX's hardware features, the faulting address of the enclave memory is page-masked. Because of this, both the controlled-channel attack and the defenses of SGX are built under the assumption that an attacker observes the memory access attempts of the enclave code with page-granularity. However, Van Bluck et al. recently demonstrated a controlled-channel attack technique which negates the prior assumption of page-granularity. In this paper, we introduce a new class of attack that stems from the reduced controlled-channel granularity, i.e., the Version IDentification attack (VID). The goal of VID attack is identifying the detailed code information inside SGX enclave by analyzing the fine-grained SGX controlled-channel. To protect enclave memory from such attack, we design and implement SGX-LEGO, an automated system that adopts execution polymorphism to the SGX enclave code. Previous defense approaches against controlled-channel attacks can be broadly categorized into two types: (i) disclosing the fault information and (ii) rendering the fault information useless. SGX-LEGO uses the latter approach by permuting the memory access sequence at the instruction level. In SGX-LEGO design, we leverage the concept of code-reuse-programming to overcome the implementation challenges regarding SGX page management. In the evaluation, we show how VID attacks the cryptographic functions, and demonstrate the efficacy of SGX-LEGO in security perspective and performance. (C) 2018 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.-
dc.languageEnglish-
dc.publisherELSEVIER ADVANCED TECHNOLOGY-
dc.titleSGX-LEGO: Fine-grained SGX controlled-channel attack and its countermeasure-
dc.typeArticle-
dc.identifier.wosid000459525800008-
dc.identifier.scopusid2-s2.0-85059228382-
dc.type.rimsART-
dc.citation.volume82-
dc.citation.beginningpage118-
dc.citation.endingpage139-
dc.citation.publicationnameCOMPUTERS & SECURITY-
dc.identifier.doi10.1016/j.cose.2018.12.001-
dc.contributor.localauthorKang, Brent Byunghoon-
dc.contributor.nonIdAuthorKim, Deokjin-
dc.contributor.nonIdAuthorJang, Daehee-
dc.contributor.nonIdAuthorJeong, Yunjong-
dc.contributor.nonIdAuthorKim, Jonghwan-
dc.contributor.nonIdAuthorChoi, Seokjin-
dc.description.isOpenAccessN-
dc.type.journalArticleArticle-
dc.subject.keywordAuthorOperating system-
dc.subject.keywordAuthorIntel SGX-
dc.subject.keywordAuthorControlled-channel-
dc.subject.keywordAuthorROP-
dc.subject.keywordAuthorPage fault-
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CS-Journal Papers(저널논문)
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