Conventional contracts, intentional behavior and logit choice: Equality without symmetry

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When coordination games are played under the logit choice rule and there is intentional bias in agents' non-best response behavior, we show that the Egalitarian bargaining solution emerges as the long run social norm. Without intentional bias, a new solution, the Logit bargaining solution emerges as the long run norm. These results contrast with results under non-payoff dependent deviations from best response behavior, where it has previously been shown that the Kalai-Smorodinsky and Nash bargaining solutions emerge as long run norms. We complement the theory with experiments on human subjects, results of which suggest that non-best response play is payoff dependent and displays intentional bias. This suggests the Egalitarian solution as the most likely candidate for a long run bargaining norm. (C) 2018 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
Publisher
ACADEMIC PRESS INC ELSEVIER SCIENCE
Issue Date
2018-07
Language
English
Article Type
Article
Keywords

NASHS BARGAINING PROBLEM; STOCHASTIC STABILITY; EQUILIBRIUM SELECTION; COORDINATION GAMES; COOPERATIVE GAMES; DYNAMICS; UTILITARIAN; EGALITARIAN

Citation

GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR, v.110, pp.273 - 294

ISSN
0899-8256
DOI
10.1016/j.geb.2018.05.002
URI
http://hdl.handle.net/10203/244985
Appears in Collection
MT-Journal Papers(저널논문)
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