Revisiting the Nuclear Transparency Concept in the Context of Non-nuclear-weapon States

Abstract

Nuclear transparency is an important concept in nonproliferation, as it helps non nuclear‐weapon states demonstrate their commitments to the nonproliferation regime, and assists the safeguards process. In this paper, we will discuss how nuclear transparency has evolved, how to frame it appropriately for better and fairer practices by state players, and how to measure it, qualitatively and quantitatively with the help of a nuclear transparency dataset. Following a discussion on the concept of nuclear transparency, the construction of a new tripartite concept of nuclear transparency was presented with emphasis on not only the states that want to prove their nonproliferation compliance, but also their audience, and how transparency information is transferred from one end to another. A range of issues with nuclear transparency was then presented, such as the cultural influence on the transparency practice in different countries, or the lack of capabilities from the receiving end to develop a true understanding of the information. To remedy this situation, a nuclear transparency dataset was proposed that included nuclear‐related factors like the participation in the nonproliferation regime and export control, as well as sociopolitical factors like involvement in inter‐state conflicts, or the level of democracy of the country.