Evolution of Altruistic Preferences among Boundedly Rational Agents

Cited 0 time in webofscience Cited 0 time in scopus
  • Hit : 292
  • Download : 0
We study the co-evolution of social preferences and bounded rationality. In particular, we show that when agents are boundedly rational, altruistic preferences are evolutionarily stable, even in environments that are deemed unfavorable for altruism in the literature. The existing standard result is that when interactions are strategic substitutes and exhibit negative externality, only selfish preferences are evolutionary stable. The key assumption underlying this result is that agents are perfectly rational. Selfish agents are thus able to play the Nash equilibrium, gaining evolutionary advantages over altruists. By relaxing this assumption, we show that altruist preferences can survive among bounded rational agents. The simple intuition is that selfish agents, now with bounded rationality, choose excessive action, which in turn induces altruists to choose an action level closer to the Nash equilibrium an action level evolutionarily stable in the long run. We combine the level-k model of bounded rationality and the standard evolutionary model of altruistic preferences and characterize for the conditions under which altruism can proliferate in the long run.
Publisher
KOREAN ECONOMIC ASSOCIATION
Issue Date
2015
Language
English
Article Type
Article
Citation

KOREAN ECONOMIC REVIEW, v.31, pp.239 - 266

ISSN
0254-3737
URI
http://hdl.handle.net/10203/219693
Appears in Collection
MT-Journal Papers(저널논문)
Files in This Item
There are no files associated with this item.

qr_code

  • mendeley

    citeulike


rss_1.0 rss_2.0 atom_1.0