A new interpretation of the Nash bargaining solution: fictitious play
| DC Field | Value | Language |
|---|---|---|
| dc.contributor.author | 인영환 | - |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2016-07-13T03:58:09Z | - |
| dc.date.available | 2016-07-13T03:58:09Z | - |
| dc.date.created | 2016-01-07 | - |
| dc.date.issued | 2015-02-25 | - |
| dc.identifier.citation | 2015 경제학 공동학술대회 | - |
| dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/10203/211157 | - |
| dc.description.abstract | We provide a new interpretation of the Nash bargaining solution, using fictitious play. Based on the finding that the Nash demand game has the fictitious play property and that almost every fictitious play process and its associated belief path converge to a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium in the Nash demand game (In, 2014), we present two initial demand games which exactly and approximately implement the Nash bargaining solution. | - |
| dc.language | Korean | - |
| dc.publisher | 한국경제학회 / 한국계량경제학회 | - |
| dc.title | A new interpretation of the Nash bargaining solution: fictitious play | - |
| dc.type | Conference | - |
| dc.type.rims | CONF | - |
| dc.citation.publicationname | 2015 경제학 공동학술대회 | - |
| dc.identifier.conferencecountry | KO | - |
| dc.identifier.conferencelocation | 서울, 연세대학교 | - |
| dc.contributor.localauthor | 인영환 | - |
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