A new interpretation of the Nash bargaining solution: fictitious play
| DC Field | Value | Language |
|---|---|---|
| dc.contributor.author | In, Younghwan | - |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2016-07-13T01:54:56Z | - |
| dc.date.available | 2016-07-13T01:54:56Z | - |
| dc.date.created | 2016-01-07 | - |
| dc.date.issued | 2015-07-21 | - |
| dc.identifier.citation | 26th International Conference on Game Theory | - |
| dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/10203/210761 | - |
| dc.description.abstract | We provide a new interpretation of the Nash bargaining solution, using fictitious play. Based on the finding that the Nash demand game has the fictitious play property and that almost every fictitious play process and its associated belief path converge to a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium in the Nash demand game (In, 2014), we present two initial demand games which exactly and approximately implement the Nash bargaining solution. | - |
| dc.language | English | - |
| dc.publisher | The Stony Brook Center for Game Theory | - |
| dc.title | A new interpretation of the Nash bargaining solution: fictitious play | - |
| dc.type | Conference | - |
| dc.type.rims | CONF | - |
| dc.citation.publicationname | 26th International Conference on Game Theory | - |
| dc.identifier.conferencecountry | US | - |
| dc.identifier.conferencelocation | Stony Brook University, Stony Brook, New York | - |
| dc.contributor.localauthor | In, Younghwan | - |
- Appears in Collection
- MT-Conference Papers(학술회의논문)
- Files in This Item
- There are no files associated with this item.
Items in DSpace are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.