DESIGN OF AN ITERATIVE MULTI-ITEM DOUBLE-AUCTION MECHANISM

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There have been many multi-item auction mechanisms. As it is not allowed for both sellers and buyers to submit bids and offers in nearly all existing multi-item auction mechanisms, the impartial profit distribution for both sellers and buyers cannot be realized in those mechanisms. Although it is possible for both sellers and buyers to submit bids and offers in a combinatorial exchange, the impartial profit distribution for all individual participants cannot be realized due to its pricing mechanism that focuses only on enforcing budget balance. This paper proposes an iterative multi-item unit-demand and unit-supply double-auction mechanism with a new winner determination and pricing mechanism for distributing profit impartially from the viewpoints of individual participants regardless of whether they are buyers or sellers. It also analyzes the theoretical features of the proposed auction mechanism, including those related to its strategic behavior and efficiency.
Publisher
Wiley-Blackwell
Issue Date
2008-01-21
Keywords

multi-itemdouble auction; profit distribution; pricingmechanism; mechanismdesign; multi-agent negotiation

Citation

Computational Intelligence, Vol.24, No.1, pp.62-75

DOI
10.1111/j.1467-8640.2007.00319.x
URI
http://hdl.handle.net/10203/17219
Appears in Collection
CS-Conference Papers(학술회의논문)

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