국제통신에서 사업자간 정산수익분할에 대한 갈등과 비효율성

Abstract

This paper examines characteristics of the accounting rate system whereby international telecommunications carriers settle net balances of account arising from bilateral traffic flows. Using a two stage game model, we explain problems in the system: growing traffic and payment imbalances, and resulting conflicts regarding accounting rates between carriers of, say, developed and developing countries. In this paper, we view the problems as a splitting-a-pie game in which one carrier cannot get more without a loss of the other, but total pie size depends upon the accounting rate. Therefore, a natural solution should be inevitably of a Coasian-type to establish a mutual agreement. In this regard, we first derive an efficient accounting rate, in the sense that it can make both carriers better off. Next we suggest some ways of attaining the efficient outcome. Regulatory and policy implications are also discussed.