Agenda restrictions in multi-issue bargaining

Cited 27 time in webofscience Cited 0 time in scopus
  • Hit : 388
  • Download : 3
We study a bilateral multi-issue bargaining procedure with complete information and endogenous agenda. In the procedure, proposals must be made on only one issue at a time, although the proposer can choose which issue to bring to the table. When bargaining frictions are small, there is a large multiplicity of equilibrium agreements, including ones with delay. However, equilibrium payoffs cannot be made arbitrarily small-perpetual disagreement cannot be supported in equilibrium. This multiplicity contrasts with the uniqueness found in the literature for a procedure where offers can be made in any subset of remaining issues. (C) 2003 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
Publisher
ELSEVIER SCIENCE BV
Issue Date
2004-03
Language
English
Article Type
Article
Keywords

NEGOTIATIONS; INFORMATION; EQUILIBRIA; MODEL; GAME

Citation

JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR ORGANIZATION, v.53, no.3, pp.385 - 399

ISSN
0167-2681
DOI
10.1016/S0167-2681(03)00087-8
URI
http://hdl.handle.net/10203/84226
Appears in Collection
MT-Journal Papers(저널논문)
Files in This Item
This item is cited by other documents in WoS
⊙ Detail Information in WoSⓡ Click to see webofscience_button
⊙ Cited 27 items in WoS Click to see citing articles in records_button

qr_code

  • mendeley

    citeulike


rss_1.0 rss_2.0 atom_1.0