DURABLE GOOD MONOPOLY, FINITE DURABILITY AND TRIGGER TIME-CONSISTENT EQUILIBRIUM

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dc.contributor.authorKim, Jae-Cheolko
dc.date.accessioned2013-02-27T05:25:21Z-
dc.date.available2013-02-27T05:25:21Z-
dc.date.created2012-02-06-
dc.date.created2012-02-06-
dc.date.created2012-02-06-
dc.date.issued1992-06-
dc.identifier.citationINTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC JOURNAL, v.6, no.2, pp.69 - 77-
dc.identifier.issn1016-8737-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10203/66703-
dc.description.abstractThis paper analyzes the problem of durable good monopoly facing linear demand function when the good decays in a one-hoss-shay fashion. It is shown that under certain conditons there can exist a time-consistent equilibrium which resembles the trigger strategy equilibrium in the repeated games.-
dc.languageEnglish-
dc.publisher한국국제경제학회-
dc.titleDURABLE GOOD MONOPOLY, FINITE DURABILITY AND TRIGGER TIME-CONSISTENT EQUILIBRIUM-
dc.typeArticle-
dc.identifier.scopusid2-s2.0-84949341670-
dc.type.rimsART-
dc.citation.volume6-
dc.citation.issue2-
dc.citation.beginningpage69-
dc.citation.endingpage77-
dc.citation.publicationnameINTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC JOURNAL-
dc.identifier.doi10.1080/10168739200080012-
dc.contributor.localauthorKim, Jae-Cheol-
dc.description.isOpenAccessN-
dc.type.journalArticleArticle-
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