DURABLE GOOD MONOPOLY, FINITE DURABILITY AND TRIGGER TIME-CONSISTENT EQUILIBRIUM

Cited 0 time in webofscience Cited 0 time in scopus
  • Hit : 183
  • Download : 0
This paper analyzes the problem of durable good monopoly facing linear demand function when the good decays in a one-hoss-shay fashion. It is shown that under certain conditons there can exist a time-consistent equilibrium which resembles the trigger strategy equilibrium in the repeated games.
Publisher
한국국제경제학회
Issue Date
1992-06
Language
English
Citation

INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC JOURNAL, v.6, no.2, pp.69 - 78

ISSN
69-77
URI
http://hdl.handle.net/10203/66703
Appears in Collection
MT-Journal Papers(저널논문)
Files in This Item
There are no files associated with this item.

qr_code

  • mendeley

    citeulike


rss_1.0 rss_2.0 atom_1.0