An optimal tax/subsidy for output and pollution control under asymmetric information in oligopoly markets

This paper constructs an optimal incentive tax/subsidy scheme in an oligopoly market with pollution, as a generalization of the Loeb-Magat scheme, which is nondiscriminatory and requires less information for implementation than the conventional ones. Some interesting properties of the scheme are discussed. © 1993 Kluwer Academic Publishers.
Publisher
Springer Netherlands
Issue Date
1993-06
Language
ENG
Citation

Journal of Regulatory Economics , v.5, no.2, pp.183 - 197

ISSN
0922-680X
URI
http://hdl.handle.net/10203/63710
Appears in Collection
KGSM-Journal Papers(저널논문)
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