The empirical analysis of the N-bilateral optimized combinatorial auction model

This study proposes a new and highly efficient, dynamic combinatorial auction mechanism-the N-bilateral optimized combinatorial auction (N-BOCA). N-BOCA is a flexible iterative combinatorial auction model that offers more optimized trading for multiple suppliers and purchasers in the supply chain than one-sided combinatorial auction. We design the N-BOCA model from the perspectives of market architecture. trading rules, and decision strategy for winner determination, the decision strategy for winner determination needs flexible optimization modeling capability. Thus rule-based reasoning was applied tor reflecting the flexible decision strategies. We also show the viability of N-BOCA through Paired Samples T-test experimentation. It shows that N-BOCA yields higher purchase efficiency and effectiveness than the one-auctioned to multi-bidders (1-to-N) combinatorial auction mechanism. (c) 2007 Published by Elsevier Ltd.
Publisher
PERGAMON-ELSEVIER SCIENCE LTD
Issue Date
2009-04
Language
ENG
Keywords

WINNER DETERMINATION; DESIGN; FRAMEWORK

Citation

OMEGA-INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF MANAGEMENT SCIENCE, v.37, no.2, pp.482 - 493

ISSN
0305-0483
DOI
10.1016/j.omega.2007.07.003
URI
http://hdl.handle.net/10203/6164
Appears in Collection
KGSF-Journal Papers(저널논문)
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