Moral hazard and incentives : maximizing the best output under minimum requirements = 도덕적 해이와 유인 : 최소한도 요구조건 하에서의 최우량 산출물 극대화에 관한 연구 maximizing the best output under minimum requirements

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This thesis focuses on the probable influence of minimum requirement terms on principal-agent problems with information asymmetry. They are indeed common in real-world situations and affect the power of incentive schemes that the principal suggests to agents ex ante. In particular, they are significant to the cases in which the final output is dependent only upon the best one; high minimum requirement levels could restrict the power of incentive schemes to be asymmetric. What matters more is the fact that if they are set excessively high, a project that would be profitable may be abandoned resulting in lowering social welfare.
Advisors
Yu, Pyung-Ilresearcher유평일researcher
Description
한국과학기술원 : 테크노경영대학원,
Publisher
한국과학기술원
Issue Date
1998
Identifier
135184/325007 / 000963511
Language
eng
Description

학위논문(석사) - 한국과학기술원 : 테크노경영대학원, 1998.2, [ iv, 49 p. ]

Keywords

Incentive; R&D output; Moral hazard; Minimum requirement; 최소한도 요구조건; 유인; 연구개발 산출물; 도덕적 해이

URI
http://hdl.handle.net/10203/53950
Link
http://library.kaist.ac.kr/search/detail/view.do?bibCtrlNo=135184&flag=dissertation
Appears in Collection
KGSM-Theses_Master(석사논문)
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