Do main banks extract rents from their client firms? Evidence from Korean Chaebol

Using a unique data set on all industrial firms listed on Korea Stock Exchange and KOSDAQ stock market from 1991 to 2000, we find that cash ratios for chaebol firms are lower than for non-chaebol firms. Controlling for access to the bond market and financial services arms does not change this result. We do however find that there is a shift in the degree of bank power over the last decade. Consistent with the main bank monopoly hypothesis during the period of corporate restructuring process after the financial crisis in 1997, the interest differential charged to chaebol firms is significantly higher than the earlier period, suggesting a substantial extraction of rents against chaebol client firms by their main banks.
Publisher
HITOTSUBASHI ACADEMY
Issue Date
2004
Language
ENG
Keywords

DIVERSIFIED BUSINESS GROUPS; ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION; LENDING RELATIONSHIPS; FINANCIAL DISTRESS; CAPITAL STRUCTURE; CASH HOLDINGS; AGENCY COSTS; INVESTMENT; CREDIT; MARKETS

Citation

HITOTSUBASHI JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS, v.45, no.1, pp.15 - 45

ISSN
0018-280X
URI
http://hdl.handle.net/10203/4175
Appears in Collection
MT-Journal Papers(저널논문)
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