An Incentive Contract with Asymmetric Information

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This Paper considers the problem of designing an optimal incentive contract between a retailer and a manufacturer when the former has private information about demand and its own cost. Based on a multi-period framework, we show that the incentive franchise contract can bring about the fist-best outcome of vertical integration when the retailer has complete information about consumers preferences. [L42, D8]
Publisher
한국국제경제학회
Issue Date
2000-06
Language
English
Citation

INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC JOURNAL, v.14, no.1, pp.99 - 110

ISSN
1016-8737
URI
http://hdl.handle.net/10203/3859
Appears in Collection
MT-Journal Papers(저널논문)
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