Design of a multi-agent based iterative multi-item double auction mechanism = 다중에이전트 기반의 반복적인 다항목 쌍방향 경매 메커니즘 설계

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There have been many multi-item auction mechanisms. As it is not allowed for both sellers and buyers to submit bids and offers in nearly all existing multi-item auction mechanisms, the impartial profit distribution for both sellers and buyers cannot be realized in those mechanisms. Under the assumption that buyers strive for maximum profit, multi-item English auctions lead to equilibriums close to the minimum competitive equilibrium that is the worst result for sellers. And under the assumption that sellers strive for maximum profit, multi-item Dutch auctions lead to equilibriums close to the maximum competitive equilibrium that is the worst result for buyers. Although it is possible for both sellers and buyers to submit bids and offers in a combinatorial exchange, the impartial profit distribution for all individual participants cannot be realized due to its pricing mechanism that focuses only on enforcing budget balance. This paper proposes an iterative multi-item unit-demand and unit-supply double-auction mechanism that can distribute profit impartially from the viewpoints of individual participants regardless of whether they are buyers or sellers. A new winner determination and pricing mechanism that considers profit restoration and oscillation avoidance are designed. Theoretical features such as dominant strategies, efficiency, strategy-proofness, the validity of the closing condition and deterministic nature of the proposed mechanism are analyzed. It is also shown that the proposed mechanism determines clearing prices according to the market situation in single item markets.
Advisors
Yang, Hyun-Seungresearcher
Description
한국과학기술원 : 전산학전공,
Publisher
한국과학기술원
Issue Date
2008
Identifier
295428/325007  / 000995121
Language
eng
Description

학위논문(박사) - 한국과학기술원 : 전산학전공, 2008.2, [ v, 51 p. ]

Keywords

다항목 쌍방향 경매; 이익분배; 가격결정; 메커니즘 설계; 다중에이전트 흥정; multi-item double auction; profit distribution; pricing mechanism; mechanism design; multi-agent negotiation; 다항목 쌍방향 경매; 이익분배; 가격결정; 메커니즘 설계; 다중에이전트 흥정; multi-item double auction; profit distribution; pricing mechanism; mechanism design; multi-agent negotiation

URI
http://hdl.handle.net/10203/33250
Link
http://library.kaist.ac.kr/search/detail/view.do?bibCtrlNo=295428&flag=dissertation
Appears in Collection
CS-Theses_Ph.D.(박사논문)
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